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ABSTRACT
Subsequent to the October 1979 shift in monetary policy in the United
States, interest rates in North America not only reached unprecedented levels,
but also exhibited unprecedented volatility. This paper shows that the
anticipated quarterly changes in long—term rates associated with the rational
expectations model have remained small during this post—shift period.
Recorded forecasts of long—term interest rates in Canada continue to prove
inferior to the no—change prediction of the martingale model. The "perverse"
relationship between the slope of the yield curve and the subsequent movement
in long—term rates exists in the Canadian data, but is of only modest value in
a forecasting context. The excess return on long—term bonds implicit in the
recorded forecasts of the level of interest rates varies sharply, yet there is
no evidence that forecasters have identified a predictable component of a
time—varying term premium.
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InOctober 1979, the Federal Reserve implemented a new policy of
targeting monetary aggregates rather than interest rates. Subsequent to this
apparent change in the conduct of monetary policy, interest rates in the
United States not only reached unprecedented levels, but also exhibited
unprecedented volatility.1 Reflecting the close linkages between the U.S. and
the Canadian capital markets, interest rates in Canada exhibited similar
behavi or.2
One element of the October 1979 change in the monetary regime that is as
yet unexplored is its impact on the forecastability" of interest rates. Two
theoretical points are now well known. First, Sargent (1976) and Pesando
(1978) have shown that under the joint hypothesis of market efficiency and a
time—invariant term premium, short—term movements in long—term interest rates
will be inherently unon_forecastable,fl at least so long as the yield curve is
reasonably flat. Under this rational expectations model of the term
structure, agents without access to inside information will not be able to
improve upon the no—change prediction of the martingale model. Secondly, as
emphasized by Pesando (1979), there is nothing in the theory of efficient
markets to suggest that agents cannot outperform the no—change prediction in
their forecasts of short—term movements in short—term interest rates.
The unprecedented levels and volatility of interest rates make timely an
investigation of two empirical questions. First, have the anticipated
quarterly changes in long—term interest rates remained sufficiently "small'
that the no—change prediction continues to characterize accurately the
rational expectations model? Secondly, have forecasters been able to
outperform the no—change prediction in this environment of volatile interest2
rates? If time—varying term premiums have become more important, as alleged
by many participants in the capital market, then short—term movements in long—
term interest rates may have a significant "forecastable" component, even if
the bond market is informationally efficient.
Further, there is an "awkward fact" regarding the slope of the term
structure and the subsequent movement in long—term interest rates that merits
attention in the forecasting context. When the term structure has a positive
slope (that is, when the long—term rate exceeds the short—term rate), the
prediction of the rational expectations model is that the long—term rate will
subsequently rise. The anticipated capital loss is necessary to equalize the
holding—period return on short— and long—term bonds, up to the time—invariant
term premium. Yet, as Shiller (1979) has emphasized, on the basis of interest
rate data drawn from both the United States and the United Kingdom, the
empirical relationship appears to be the opposite. Under the null hypothesis
of market efficiency, the implication is that a time—varying term premium does
exist and is positively related to the slope of the yield curve. The
quantitative importance of this relationship, and the question of whether it
is reflected in recorded forecasts, merit attention.
Due to the availability of recorded forecasts of both short—term and
long—term interest rates in Canada,3 it is useful to address these empirical
questions with Canadian data. This paper is thus organized as follows.
First, the post October 1979 data on interest rates in Canada are examined to
see if the anticipated quarterly changes in long—term interest rates under the
rational expectations model continue to be "small." Secondly, three sets of
recorded forecasts of short—term and long—term interest rates are evaluated,
using the no—change prediction of the martingale model as a benchmark. To
provide an additional perspective, the excess returns on long—term bonds that3
are implied by the recorded forecasts are also calculated. Thirdly, the
relationship between the future change in the long—term interest rate and the
current slope of the yield curve is explored, both before and after the
October 1979 shift in policy. The importance of any time—varying term premium
so identified is quantified, and used to provide a further perspective on the
evaluation of the recorded forecasts. A summary and statement of conclusions
completes the paper.
II.Anticipated Changes in Long—term Interest Rates under the Rational
Expectations Model
Let denote the expected return on an n—period bond held
during period t ,letrt denote the one—period interest rate at the
beginning of period t ,andlet denote the marginal term premium —
assumedto be time—invariant —accordedan n—period bond if held for one
period. Then, in its most useful formulation for the present purpose,4 the
rational expectations model requires:
=r
+(n) (1)
Implicit in (1) is the value of the long—term interest rate (now, an (n—i)—
period rate) expected to prevail at t+i.This is the long—term rate which
produces the capital gain or loss necessary to satisfy (1).The anticipated
change in the long—term interest rate is the difference between this expected
long—term rate and its current value.
To calculate the anticipated change in the long—term rate, it is useful
to employ the linearized expression for the holding—period yield on long—term
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The anticipated change in the long—term interest rate under the rational
expectations model is thus:
E(R) - =[(1- - (rt+ (4)
If one has data on an index of long—term interest rates (ideally, a constant
maturity index), one can comfortably ignore the change in the maturity of the
bond and simply refer to the left—hand—side of (4) as the anticipated change
in the long—term rate.
Have the anticipated changes in the long—term interest rate under the
rational expectations model remained "small" subsequent to the October 1979
change in the policy regime? Since economists traditionally forecast
macroeconomic variables on a quarterly basis, and since recorded data on
quarterly interest rate forecasts are available, this is the unit of
observation adopted in the remainder of this paper. Data on 90—day Treasury
bills and long—term Government of Canada bonds, as well as data on 90—day
finance company paper and long—term corporate bonds, permit us to calculate5
the anticipated changes in the respective long—term rates. To implement
equation (4), we need: (i) to specify the terms to maturity of the respective
indexes of long—term interest rates; (ii) to estimate the marginal term
premium, and (iii) to choose the "normal" long—term rate around which to
linearize the expression for the holding—period yield.
For both the Canada and the corporate bonds, the term to maturity is 17
years or 68 quarters (n =68).6As shown by McCulloch (1975), the marginal
term premium approaches the average term premium quite rapidly. The latter —
underthe rational expectations model —issimply equal to the average spread
between the long—term and the corresponding short—term interest rate. During
the period 1979:4—1985:3, the spread between the long—term Canada rate and the
90—day bill rate averaged 46 basis points, and the spread between the
corporate bond rate and the paper rate averaged 107 basis points. These
figures are used to approximate the marginal term premium which appears in
equation (4). For the period 1957:1 to 1979:3, these term premiums were set
equal to the corresponding spreads of 131 and 133 basis points, respectively.
The average value of the long—term rates rose sharply in the later
sample period, from 6.72% and 7.63% to 12.97% and 13.96% for the Canada and
corporate bonds, respectively. In light of these sharp increases, it is
inappropriate to linearize around the average value of the long—term rates
over the combined sample periods. Instead, we linearized around the average
values in each of the two subperiods. This raised the value of the term
enclosed in square brackets on the r.h.s. of (4) by about 50% in the later
sample period.7 Other things equal, this raises the anticipated changes in
long—term rates associated with the rational expectations model by about 50%
in this post—shift sample period.86
The actual arid anticipated changes for the long—term Canada and
corporate rates are summarized in Table 1. To focus on the impact of the
shift in the policy regime, the results for the period 1957:1—1979:3 are
contrasted with those for the period 1979:4—1985:3.
The results indicate that anticipated changes in long—term rates are
about three times larger after the shift in the policy regime, yet still
relatively small. The mean absolute anticipated change in the long—term
Canada rate equalled 6.39 basis points after the shift, compared to 2.10 basis
points before the shift.9 For corporate bonds, the corresponding figures are
7.08 basis points and 2.57 basis points.10 The maximum anticipated change in
the Canada bond rate rose from 6.60 basis points to 17.63 basis points; in the
corporate bond rate, from 9.32 basis points to 20.17 basis points.1'
In spite of the increased size and volatility of the anticipated changes
in the long—term rate, these anticipated changes continue to be dominated by
the actual changes. For the Canada bonds, the mean absolute value of the
actual change in the long—term rate equalled 109 basis points, which is close
to twenty times the mean absolute value of the anticipated change. Of
particular significance is the size of the variance of the actual changes
compared to that of the anticipated changes. The ratio of the latter to the
former equalled 0.3% for the Canada bonds, and 0.4% for the corporate bonds.
These fractions are lower than the corresponding ones for the earlier sample
period. Under the rational expectations model, anticipated and unanticipated
changes in the long—term rate must be uncorrelated. Under this model, 99.7%
and 99.6% of the variances of the observed changes in the interest rate on
Canada and corporate bonds in the post—shift sample period reflect the receipt
of new information.7
Table 1
Actual and Anticipated Changes in Long—Term Interest Rates in Canada:
1957:1 —1985:3
Period 1957:1 —1979:3










Mean Absolute Change 2.10 26.51 2.57 23.33
Maximum Absolute Change 6.60 127.00 9.32 119.00
Mean Change 0.04 7.04 0.03 6.45
Standard Deviation 2.72 34.84 3.23 30.82
Period 1979:4 —1985:3
6.39 108.67 Mean Absolute Change 7.08 113.13
Maximum Absolute Change 17.63 263.00 20.17 316.00
Mean Change —0.53 2.42 —0.59 2.38
Standard Deviation 7.83 139.39 8.84 145.83
Note:All numbers refer to basis points at annual rates.8
III. An Analysis of Recorded Interest Rate Forecasts in Canada
Pesando (1981) examined the recorded forecasts of both short— and long—
term interest rates in Canada made by Data Resources Incorporated (DRI) of
Canada and the Conference Board in Canada, as well as the means of the
quarterly surveys of interest rate forecasts compiled by McLeod, Young, Weir
and Company Limited. He found that the no—change prediction of the martingale
model outperformed the recorded forecasts of the long—term rates, but not of
the short—term rates.
We have updated the recorded forecasts examined in this earlier study,
in order to assess the impact —ifany —ofthe October 1979 shift in the
monetary regime on the accuracy of the recorded forecasts. Under the rational
expectations model, anticipated changes in the long—term interest rate have
increased in the post—shift period, suggesting cet. par. that the recorded
forecasts of long—term rates are more likely to outperform the no—change
prediction. Further, if time—varying term premiums have become more
important, then the rational expectations model will be a less satisfactory
approximation to reality. If so, the implication —again—isthat the
recorded forecasts of long—term rates are more likely to outperform the
martingale model. As previously noted, there is nothing in the theory of
efficient markets to suggest that agents cannot outperform the no—change
prediction in their forecasts of movements in short—term rates. The success
of the recorded forecasts of short—term rates documented in the earlier paper
serves, in the main, to enhance the "credibility't of the recorded forecastsof
long—term rates, in spite of the inability of the latter to outperform the no—
change prediction.
The root—mean—square errors of the recorded forecasts, both one quarter
and two quarters ahead and for the pre— and post—shift sample periods, are9
shown in Table 2.12 Shown also are the root—mean—square errors of the no—
change prediction. The martingale forecasts were set equal to the interest
rate at the end of the latest month which unambiguously preceded the month in
which the recorded forecasts were made. This procedure confers an
informational advantage to the recorded forecasts. This advantage typically
consisted of about two weeks, but in some cases approached a full month.
On balance, the recorded forecasts fare quite poorly. There is no
evidence that the recorded forecasts of the long—term rates are superior to
the no—change prediction. Forecasts of the long—term rate (or rates) by DRI
and the Conference Board were significantly inferior to the martingale model
in the post—shift period, while the accuracy of the survey forecasts compiled
by McLeod, Young, Weir is about the same as that of the no—change prediction.
The most distinguishing feature of the post—regime results, however, is the
deterioration in the accuracy of the recorded forecasts of the short—term
rates. For both DRI and the Conference Board, the recorded forecasts of the
short—term rate are also inferior to the martingale model.13
Financial practitioners often emphasize the ability of forecasters to
predict turning points in interest rates as a major —ifnot the major —
criterionin performance evaluation. For portfolio managers, whose relevant
decision may be to increase or to reduce the fraction of their funds allocated
to long—term bonds, the implicit loss function apparently assigns considerable
weight to directional guidance.
The success of the recorded forecasts in identifying turning—points is
summarized in Table 2A. The key measure is the fraction of the one—period
(E(R?) —R')and two—period (Et(R) —R) forecasts of the change
in the long—term rate that are correctly signed. For the combined sample
period, the fraction of the one—period forecasts that are correctly signed10
Table2
Recorded Forecasts of Short— and Long—term Interest Rates
Versus the Martingale Alternativea
Root Mean Square Forecasting Errors
One Period Two Period
Source Sample Series Recorded Mai- ale Recorded Martingale
Data Resources Pre—Shift
of Canada 1975:2—1979:3 90—day Treasury bills 89.3 82.9 159.5 140.4
90—day Finance paper 749 80.9 142.6 141.5
Long—term Canada bonds 42.6 37.3 87.0 81.0
McLpod, Young, Weir 45.7 36.7 90.4 77.2
10 industrial bonds
McLeod, Young, Weir 38.6 37.0 81.7 79.2
10 provincial bonds
Post—Shi ft
1979:4—1985:2 90—day Treasury bills 189.3 179.0 323.5 304.5
90—day Finance paper 192.9 188.9 333.6 309.1
Long_term Canada bonds 124.4 110.3 186.0 150.7
McLeod, Young, Weir 146.8 117.9 202.7 166.7
10 industrial bonds
McLeod, Young, Weir 146.5 117.8 198.9 160.9
10 provincial bonds
The Conference Board pre_Shiftb
in Canada T75:1—1979:3 90—day Finance paper 81.5 85.6 129.2 134.0
McLeod, Young, Weir 44.7 37.4 87.6 72.2
10 industrial bonds
post_Shiftb
T979:iT4:4 90—day Finance paper 167.5 142.3 293.2 277.2
McLeod, Young, Weir 147.9 112.1 184.2 170.5
10 industrial bonds
McLeod, Young, Pre—Shift
Weir surveys 1974:4—1979:3 90—day Finance paper 98.4 118.0 173.1 178.4
McLeod, Young, Weir 43.5 45.2 95.0 92.3
10 industrial bonds
McLeod, Young, Weir 47 49.0 99.7 93.8
10 provincial bonds
Post_ShiftC
1979:4—1985:2 90—day Finance paper 265.2 282.1 344.8 343.6
1979:4—1982:4 McLeod, Young, Weir 193.3 191.1 242.3 240.0
10 industrial bonds
1979:4—1982:4 McLeod, Young, Weir 187.4 194.5 231.6 236.1
10 provincial bonds
a DRI and the Conference Board forecast the average value of the interest rate during the quarter. The realization,
in calculating the forecast errors, is set equal to the average value of the interest rate during the quarter to
which the recorded forecast pertains. In the McLeod, Young, Weir surveys, it is the end-of-quarter interest rate
that is being forecast, and the realization used aretherates prevailing on the last Wednesday of the quarter
for which the forecast is made. Forecast dates for the recorded figures vary within the quarter and are thus not
strictly comparable across forecast sources. Forecast errors, in basis points, are expressed at annual rates.
b Observations for 1979:2 and 1981:3 were unavailable.
c Starting in 1983:1, the survey no longer requested participants to forecast the long—term provincial and corporate
bond rates.11
Table 2A
Success of the Recorded Forecasts in Predicting Turning Points
Fraction of Forecast Changes that
Are Correctly Signed
Source Sample Series One—Period HorizonaTwo—Period HorIZonb
Data Resources Pre—Shift
of Canada 1975:2—1979:3 90—day Treasury bills 14/18 12/18
90—day Finance paper 11/18 11/18
Long—term Canada bonds 12/18 13/18
McLeod, Young, Weir 7/18 10/18
10 Industrial bonds
McLeod, Young, Weir 9/18 13/18
10 provincial bonds
Post—Shift
1979:4—1985:2 90—day Treasury bills 14/23 14/23
90—day Finance paper 14/23 14/23
Long—term Canada bonds 12/23 11/23
McLeod, Young, Weir 10/23 13/23
10 industrial bonds
McLeod, Young, Weir 10/23 11/23
10 provincial bonds
The Conference Board pre_ShiftC
in Canada 1975:1—1979:3 90—day Finance paper 11/18 11/18
McLeod, Young, Weir 11/18 11/18
10 industrial bonds
Post—Shift
1979:4—1984:4 90—day Finance paper 14/20 11/20
McLeod, Young, Weir 12/20 11/20
10 industrial bonds
Mcleod, Young, Pre—Shift
Weir surveys 1974:4—1979:3 90—day Finance paper 14/20 15/20
McLeod, Young, Weir 12/20 13/23
10 industrial bonds
McLeod, Young, Weir 12/20 13/20
10 provincial bonds
Post_ShiftC
Tg79:4—l985:2 90—day Finance paper 10/23 11/23
1979:4—1982:4 McLeod, Young, Weir 4/13 7/13
10 industrial bor,d
1979:4—1982:4 McLeod, Young, weir 4/13 8/13
10 provncia1 bonds
aE (R' g() t' t+l' —t
bE (R' t' t+2' —t
cObservations for 1979:2 and 1981:3 were unavailable.12
ranges from 0.415 (DRI, industrial bond rate) to 0.605 (Conference Board,
industrial bond rate). For four of the six sets of forecasts, the direction
of change in the long—term rate is predicted correctly less than one—half of
the time. This is true in the post—shift period as well as in the combined
sample period. In short, there is nothing in the assessment of their
directional accuracy to overturn the prior conclusion that the performance of
the recorded forecasts is poor.
The fraction of the recorded forecasts of the change in the short—term
rate that are correctly signed is higher, in both the pre—shift and the post—
shift periods. For three of the four data sets, the direction of change is
correctly predicted more than one—half of the time in the post—shift period.
However, this appears to be the only —andquite modest —successof the
forecasters in predicting short—term rates during the post—shift period.
In spite of their lack of success in the post—shift period, it is
instructive to examine two other features of the recorded forecasts. The
first is the size of the forecast changes in the long—term rates. If these
are large relative to those associated with the rational expectations model,
then either those making the forecasts implicitly assume (1) the market is not
efficient in its use of information or (2) time—varying term premiums do exist
and are "forecastable." Second, it is useful to identify the excess returns
(i.e., the holding—period yield on long—term bonds less the corresponding
short—term rate) that are implicit in the recorded forecasts. If the market
is efficient in its use of information, these excess returns reflect the term
premiums anticipated by those making the forecasts. The question of whether
these forecast excess returns reflect any systematic component that exists in
realized excess returns merits investigation.13
The mean absolute values of the forecast changes in the long—term rates
are presented in Table 3, for both the pre—shift and post—shift periods. For
all three sets of recorded forecasts, these mean absolute changes are far
greater than those implied by the rational expectations model. During the
post—shift period, for example, the mean absolute changes in the long—term
Canada rate forecast by DRI, one and two quarters ahead, were 66.7 basis
points and 32.8 basis points, respectively.14 These forecast changes far
exceed the mean absolute change of 6.4 basis points implied by the rational
expectations model during this post—shift period.
For all three sets of recorded forecasts, the mean absolute values of
the predicted changes in long—term rates are also greater in the post—shift
than in the pre—shift period. In effect, this indicates that the forecasters
deemed the rational expectations model to fit less well in the post—shift
period. The results reported in Table 3 suggest that either forecasters. view
the market as inefficient in its use of information and/or believe that time—
varying (and forecastable) term premiums contribute importantly to the
movement in long—term interest rates. If these forecasters believe the
capital market to be efficient, the implication is that they assign increased
importance to the role of time—varying term premiums in the post—shift period.
As noted, this possibility is raised frequently in the financial press.
The large values of the forecast changes in long—term rates correspond
to substantial capital gains and losses, and hence to implicit forecasts of
holding—period yields on long—term bonds which vary across a wide range.
Using the linearized expression for the holding—period yield (equation (2)),
we have calculated the implicit forecasts of the holding—period yield on long—
term bonds as well as their excess return. The latter equals the forecast
holding—period yield less the corresponding short—term rate at the beginning
of the forecast period (i.e., E(H") -rt).14
Table 3
Mean Absolute Values of Forecast Quarterly Changes
in Long—term Interest Rates
Mean Absolute Values of Forecast Changes
One Quarter Two Quarters
Source Sample Series Ahead Ahead
Data Resources 1975:2—1979:3 Long—term Canada bonds 22.2 19.4
of Canadaa 1979:4—1985:2
66.7 32.8
1975:2—1979:3 McLeod, Young, Weir 18.4 14.9
10 industrial bonds
1979:4—1985:2 75.0 30.5
1975:2—1979:3 McLeod, Young, Weir 19.8 18.9
10 provincial bonds
1979:4—1985:2 76.8 31.4
The Conference Board 1975:1—1979:3 McLeod, Young, Weir 16.1 13.5
In Canada 10 industrial bonds
1979:4—1984:4 34.9 20.4




1975:1—1979:3 McLeod, Young, Weir 14.8 11.6
10 provincial bonds
1979:4—1982:4 62.1 23.0
a For the DRI and the Conference Board in Canada, the last quarter'svalue as
reported by the forecaster is subtracted from the one—quarter—ahead
forecast to obtain the one—quarter—ahead forecast change. For the McLeod,
Young, Weir surveys, the base rate reported in the surveys isused.
Forecast changes are in basis points at annual rates.
b Observations for 1979:2 and 1981:3 were unavailable.15
From Table 3, it is clear that the predicted changes in long—term rates
are smaller, and hence the implied capital gains and losses are smaller, in
the two—quarters—ahead forecasts. Thus the two—quarters—ahead forecasts of
the holding—period yields are likely to vary across a narrower range than the
one—quarter ahead forecasts. Because the two—quarter—ahead changes are more
precisely measured (since there is no uncertainty about the base rate used in
their construction), it is useful to focus on the two—quarter—ahead forecasts
of holding—period yields and excess returns. If their variation is large, so
must be the variation in (the less precisely measured) one—quarter—ahead
forecasts.
These two—quarters—ahead forecasts are presented in Table 4. Note that
the variation in predicted holding—period yields and excess returns is large,
especially in the post—shift period. Consider, again, the DRI forecast of the
long—term Canada rate. In the pre—shift period, the implied forecast of the
quarterly holding—period yield on long—term Canada bonds has a mean of 12.82%,
and a range of —0.94% to 27.53%. In the post—shift period, the implied
forecast has a mean of 16.42%, with a range of —9.08% to 29.57%. The implied
excess return has a mean of 4.08% and range of —9.74% to 18.67% in the pre—
shift period, and a mean of 4.10% and a range of —21.09% to 19.34% in the
post—shift period.
In short, the excess returns on long—term bonds implicit in the recorded
forecasts vary across a wide range. If those making these forecasts view the
market as efficient, this variation suggests that they anticipate large
quarter—to—quarter movements in time—varying term premiums.15
Finally, it is interesting to note that practitioners sometimes
criticize forecasters for predicting changes in long—term rates that are too
small relative to observed changes. Melton (1986), for example, observes
critically (page 3):16
Table 4
Holding—Period Yields and Excess Returns Implicit
in the Recorded Forecastsa
Holding—Period Yield Excess Return
Source Sample Series on Long—term Bonds on Long—term Bonds
Mean Range Mean
Data Resources 1975:2—1979:3 Long—term Canada bonds 12.82 —0.94 to 27.53 4.08 —9.74 to 18.67
of Canada 1979:4—1985:2 16.42 —9.08 to 29.58 4.10 —21.08 to 19.34
1975:2—1979:3 McLeod, Young, Weir 12.63 1.91 to 25.89 3.38 —7.61 to 13.96
10 industrial bonds
1979:4—1985:2 17.30 —6.65 to 30.91 4.68 —19.15 to 20.45
The Conference Board 1975:1—1979:3 McLeod, Young, Weir 10.30 0.71 to 31.90 1.50 —8.41 to 25.98
in CanadaU 10 industrial bonds
1979:4—1984:4 16.18 6.31 to 26.32 3.32 —12.92 to 16.50
McLeod, Young, 1975:1—1979:3 UcLeod, Young, Weir 13.06 6.85 to 20.34 4.08 —1.51 to 8.05
Weir, surveys 10 industrial bonds
1979:4—1982:4 15.82 2.20 to 29.69 1.60 —12.80 to 13.50
a Data refer to holding—period yields and excess returns based on the two—
quarter—ahead forecasts of interest rate changes, as shown in Table 3.
Holding—period yields and excess returns are expressed as percentage points
at annual rates.
b Observations for 1979:2 and 1981:3 were unavailable.17
"...in the five years that Institutional Investor has surveyed
economists concerning their expectations for interest rates, the
average absolute forecast.. .was 97 basis points, compared to 173
basis points in rea1ity"
Melton subsequently analyses (page 10) the "persistent tendency for some
economists to understate the magnitude of future changes of interest rates."
The criticism that forecasters understate the actual volatility of long—
term interest rates is, of course, dramatically at odds with the message from
the rational expectations model. Such critics would appear to implicitly
reject the hypothesis that capital markets are efficient, since the variation
in ex post returns on long—term bonds is far greater than that which one might
reasonably assign to the role of a time—varying term premium. The predicted
annual changes in the long—term rate cited in the previous quotation imply
that the excess return on long—term relative to short—term bonds is forecast
to vary over a wide range.It seems fair to ask whether forecasts that the
excess return on common stocks relative to short—term bonds will vary over a
comparable range would be assigned much credibility by market participants.
IV.The Slope of the Yield Curve and the Forecastability" of Changes in the
Long—term Interest Rate
Implicit in the rational expectations model is a positive relationship
between the current slope of the yield curve and the subsequent movement in
the long—term interest rate. When the term structure has a positive slope
(that is, when the long—term rate exceeds the short—term rate), the prediction
of the rational expectations model is that the long—term rate will
subsequently rise. The anticipated capital loss is necessary to equalize —up
to the time—invariant term premium —theholding—period return on short— and
long—term bonds.18
However, as Shiller (1979) has noted using interest rate data drawn from
both the United States and the United Kingdom, the empirical relationship
appears to be the opposite. Subsequent movements in long—term rates are
negatively related to the current slope of the yield curve. None of the data
sets examined by Shiller extend beyond 1977, so his evidence does not pertain
to the post—shift period.16 Under the null hypothesis of market efficiency,
the implication of the "perverse" forecasting result identified by Shiller is
that a time—varying term premium does exist, and is positively related to the
slope of the yield curve. When the long—term rate exceeds the short—term
rate, long—term bonds are priced by the market to provide an excess return




Does this "perverse forecasting relationship exist in the Canadian
data, in both the pre— and post—shift periods? This question is readily
answered. Regressions of the future change in the long—term rate on the
current slope of the yield curve, for both the Canada and the corporate bonds,
are presented in Table 5. For long—term Canada bonds, the relationship
between the subsequent change in the long—term rate and the current slope of
the yield curve is negative, in the pre—shift, post—shift and combined sample
periods. In no sample period, however, is the coefficient of the yield curve
significantly different fromzero)8 For the corporate bonds, the negative
relationship exists in all three periods, and is significant in the pre—shift
and the combined sample periods.
Regressions of the excess returns of these long—term bonds on the slope
of the yield curve are also presented in Table 5. They, of course, provide
similar results. In all cases, the slope coefficients are positive,
indicating that excess returns vary positively with the long—short spread.19
Table 5
The Predictive Content of the Slope of the Yield Curve
Coeff.
Dependent Constant of
Variable Sample Period TermR)_rt P2S.E.E.0.W.
1. —p(fl) 1957:1—1985:2 12.99—0.061 0.015 69.94 2.17
t+1 t (1.56) (1.33)
(Canada bonds)
2. 1957:1—1979:3 10.81—0.021 0.004 36.13 1.73
(1.85) (0.62)
3. 1979:4—1985:2 3.41—0.132 0.040 141.51 2.33
(0.12) (0.94)
4. — 1957:1—1985:2 19.61—0.111 0.055 69.64 2.17
t+1 t (2.30)* (2.56)*
(Corporate bonds)
5. 1957:1—1979:3 14.82 —0.055 0.046 31.71 1.56
(3.04)* (2.06)*
6. 1979:4—1985:2 16.65 —0.185 0.083 144.72 2.31
(0.50) (1.38)
7. —r 1957:1—1985:2 —441 2.717 0.0332120 2.07
t t (1.74)(1.94)
(Canada bonds)
8. 1957:1—1979:3 —433 1.843 0.0201446 1.73
(1.85) (1.35)
9. 1979:4—1985:2 —92 4.563 0.0643830 2.33
(0.11) (1.20)
10. 11(n) —rt




" " 1957:1—1979:3 —558 3.079 0.0951193 1.56
(3.04)(3.06)*
12. 1979:4—1985:2 —427 5.748 0.1173711 2.31
(0.50) (1.67)
Notes: Interest rates or holding—period yields are expressed in basis points
at annual rates.
Bracketed figures are t—statistics. Asterisks indicate coefficients
which are significantly different from zero at the 95% confidence
level.20
The relationship is significant for the corporate bonds, but only in the pre—
shift and combined sample periods. One cannot, however, reject the null
hypothesis that the relationship between future changes in the corporate bond
rate and the slope of the yield curve is the same in the pre— and post—shift
periods.19 This suggests that the relationship may prove to be useful in a
forecasting context. Further, as evidenced by the magnitude of the point
estimate of the slope coefficient, this relationship may be quantitatively
important. In the pre—shift period, for which this point estimate is the
smallest, it nonetheless equals 3.079. This implies that a one hundred basis
point increase in the long—short spread is associated with a 307.9 basis point
increase in the excess return on long—term corporate bonds.
As highlighted by the excess return regressions, even a small
correlation between the future change in the long—term rate and the current
slope of the yield curve may be important in an economic sense. It is thus
instructive to determine whether the observed relationships are sufficiently
stable so as to be useful in a forecasting context. A natural breakpoint in
the sample is the apparent shift in the monetary regime which occurred in the
third quarter of 1979. Equations (2) and (5) in Table 5 were thus used to
generate forecasts of the change in the long—term Canada and corporate rates,
respectively, in the post—shift period. The root—mean—square errors of this
forecasting procedure were then compared to those of the no—change prediction
of the martingale model.
For both the Canada and the corporate bonds, the predicted changes using
the "slope'1 regressions are more accurate than the no—change predictions, but
only modestly so. For the Canada bonds, the root—mean—square error for the
period 1979:4—1985:2 is 137.7 basis points, compared to 139.4 basis points for
the martingale model. For the corporate bonds, the corresponding figures are
141.8 basis points and 145.7 basis points.21
The predicted changes from the "slope" regressions are considerably more
accurate than the recorded forecasts. However, this is due —inthe main —to
the inferiority of the recorded forecasts relative to the no—change
prediction. For the McLeod, Young, Weir surveys, the root—mean—square error
of the one—quarter ahead forecasts of the corporate rate for the period
1979:4—1982:4 (the period for which the survey data are available) equals
193.3 basis points, compared to 174.7 basis points for the "slope" regression.
For the one—quarter ahead DRI forecasts of the Canada rate, the margin of
superiority for the "slope" regression is 107.9 basis points to 124.4 basis
points.20 And so on.
Finally, it is instructive to examine the relationship between the
change in the long rate implicit in the recorded forecasts and the slope of
the yield curve. Regressions of the one—quarter—ahead and two—quarter ahead
implicit forecasts of the change in the long—term rate on, respectively, the
current slope and the one—quarter—ahead forecast slope of the yield curve are
presented in Table 6. Interestingly, in the two cases in which a significant
relationship exists, it is in the direction required by the rational
expectations model. When the long rate exceeds the short rate, the forecast
is that the long rate will rise, and conversely. This is not, however, the
relationship that exists in the actual data.
V. Sumary and Conclusions
The substantive results contained in this paper can be summarized
succinctly. First, in spite of the increase in both the level and the
volatility of interest rates in Canada following the October 1979 shift in the
monetary regime in the United States, the anticipated quarterly changes in
long—term rates implied by the rational expectations model remain "small."22
Table 6
The Recorded Forecasts and the Slope of the Yield Curve
Coeff.1
Constant 2
Dependent Variable Forecaster TermR _r R Sample Period
1. E(R) — Conference Board —5.89—0.04 0.018 1975:l_1984:4b
(0.55) (0.80)
(Corporate bonds)
2. " DataResources Inc. —36.65 0.15 0.156 1975:2—1985:2
(3.00)* (2.69)*
3.
- ' McLeod,Young, Weir —25.17 0.01 0.000 1974:4—1982:4
surveys (2.10) (0.09)
4.E (R) —4n) Data Resources Inc. —17.80 0.09 0.052 1975:2—1985:2 t
(1.77) (1.46)
(Canada bonds)




6. Data Resources Inc. —13.46 *0.02 0.024 1975:2—1985:2
(2.57) (0.97)
7. McLeod, Young, Weir —12.96 0.06 0.204 1974:4—1982:4
surveys (3.20)* (2.82)*




aFor equations 5 through 8, this "slope" variable equals Et(Rt —
bObservations for 1979:2 and 1981:3 were unavailable.
Bracketed figures are t—statistics. Asterisks indicate coefficients which
are significantly different from zero at the 95% level.23
This suggests that the no—change prediction remains a close approximation to
the rational expectations model, at least over quarterly forecast horizons.
Second, recorded forecasts of long—term interest rates in Canada during this
post—shift period prove to be less accurate than the no—change prediction.
Third, these recorded forecasts of the level of long—term rates imply forecast
changes in these rates far in excess of those associated with the rational
expectations model. The implication is that the excess return on long—term
relative to short—term bonds is forecast to vary over a wide range. Such
variation may be associated with a belief that a time—varying term premium
contributes importantly to the movement in the long—term interest rate.21
There is nothing in the performance of the recorded forecasts, however, to
suggest that the systematic element of a term premium —ifit exists —has
been identified by the forecasters.22
Finally, in both the pre— and post—shift period, the subsequent movement
in long—term rates is negatively correlated with the long—short spread. This
is, of course, the opposite of the relationship implied by the rational
expectations model, and invites the interpretation that a time—varying term
premium is linked to the slope of the yield curve. Nonetheless, this negative
relationship is statistically significant only for the corporate bond rate,
and not in the post—shift period. This "perverse" relationship between the
current slope of the yield curve and the subsequent movement in the long—term
rate is, at least for Canadian data, of only modest value in a forecasting
context. Somewhat paradoxically, the forecasts of the change in the long—term
rate that are implicit in the recorded forecasts, when significantly related
to the slope of the yield curve, are in the direction required by the rational
expectations model.24
FOOTNOTES
1.The increased volatility of interest rates in the United States in the
period subsequent to the October 1979 shift in policy has received
considerable attention. See, for example, Roley (1983) and Walsh
(1984).
2 During the six years prior to the shift in policy (1973:4—1979:3), the
90—day bill rate had a quarterly mean of 8.38% and a standard deviation
of 1.49%. During the six years subsequent to the shift in policy
(1979:4—1985:3), these rose to 12.52% and 3.31%. For long—term
Government of Canada bonds, the mean interest rate rose from 9.12% to
12.97%, while the standard deviation rose from 0.61% to 1.76%.
3.For the pre—shift period 1975—1978, Pesando (1981) examined the accuracy
of the short— and long—term interest rate predictions of Data Resources
Incorporated of Canada, the Conference Board in Canada, and the McLeod,
Young, Weir surveys. These recorded forecasts, updated to the post—
shift period, are examined in the present study.
4. As is well known (Cox, Ingersoll and Ross (1981)), the several different
formulations of the pure expectations model of the term structure are —
dueto Jensen's Inequality —inconsistentif interest rates are random.
5.SMiler (1979) shows that the approximation error resulting from this
linearization is not large, a point emphasized more recently by Campbell
(1984).
6.The corporate bond series in the McLeod, Young, Weir 10 industrials,
compiled by McLeod, Young, Weir and Company Limited. The other series
are compiled by the Bank of Canada. The corporate bond rates are those
prevailing on the last business day in the quarter. All of the other25
rates are those prevailing on the last Wednesday in the quarter. For
corporate bonds, the reported term to maturity figure of 17 years is
clouded by the existence of call options and sinking funds. The
maturity figures are reported under the convention that the maturity of
a bond equals its maturity date if the bond is trading beneath par, and
equals its earliest call date if the bond is trading above par. For
this reason, one has more confidence in the constructed series of the
anticipated changes in the long—term Canada rate.
7.The value of this term rose by 47.1% for the Canada bonds, and by 46.0%
for the corporate bonds.
8. Intuitively, it is the percentage change in the long—term rate which
produces the anticipated gain or loss. The higher is the level of the
long—term rate, the larger must be the absolute change in the long—term
rate to produce this percentage change.
9.We also calculated the anticipated change in one of the most actively
traded long—term Canada bonds (the 9.5's of 2001), again as implied by
the alternative of holding a 90—day Treasury bill. For this
calculation, we incorporated the fact that the maturity of the bond
declines by one quarter with each observation. For this bond, the
average absolute value of the anticipated change for the period 1979:4
to 1985:3 equalled 5.65 basis points, which is close to the figure of
6.39 basis points obtained for the index of long—term Canada rates.
10. If, contrary to most empirical studies, the term premium is set equal to
zero (i.e., the pure expectations hypothesis is assumed), the mean
absolute anticipated changes in the long—term rate in the post—shift
period rise to 6.93 and 8.37 basis points for Canada and corporate
bonds, respectively. These higher values reflect the tendency of long—26
term to exceed short—term rates, which thus requires —onaverage —ex
ante increases in long—term rates to produce the capital losses
necessary to equilibrate ex ante returns.
11. Both maximums occur in 1981:1. In this quarter, the bill rate equalled
16.44% and the Canada bond rate equalled 13.48%. An anticipated decline
in the long—term rate of 0.1763% or 17.63 basis points is necessary to
produce the anticipated capital gain required by equation (1), given our
estimate of the term premium.
12.The forecasts of DRI and the Conference Board are for the average
interest rate to prevail in the quarter, while the survey forecasts
compiled by McLeod, Young, Weir are for end—of—quarter interest rates.
To calculate the forecast errors for DRI and the Conference Board,
realizations were set equal to the average interest rate in the quarter,
as measured by the average of the interest rates on the last Wednesday
in each month during the quarter. To calculate the forecast errors for
the McLeod, Young, Weir surveys, realizations were set equal to the
interest rate on the last Wednesday in the quarter.
13.The root—mean—square errors reported for the pre—shift sample in Table
2, for both the recorded forecasts and the martingale model, are
larger —oftenconsiderably so —thanthe errors reported for a roughly
similar period in Pesando (1981). The increased errors reflected the
typically large errors that occurred in the first three quarters of
1979, which were not included in the earlier paper.
14.For the DRI and Conference Board forecasts, the one—quarter—ahead
changes are calculated by subtracting the value in the current quarter
as reported by the forecaster from the one—quarter—ahead forecast of the
average level of the interest rate. The one—quarter—ahead changes were27
also calculated by subtracting the interest rate at the end of the month
which served as the base period for the forecast. In all cases except
for the one—quarter—ahead change in the McLeod, Young, Weir 10
industrials forecast by DRI, the mean absolute values of the forecast
changes were greater using the latter procedure, and thus greater than
the changes reported in Table 3.
15.There also exists the possibility that the forecasters are unaware of
this implication of their predictions about the future levels of
interest rates. In light of this possibility, it might prove useful for
forecasters to calculate the holding—period yields and excess returns
implicit in their predictions of interest rate levels.
16.Campbell and Shiller (1984) find continuing evidence of this "perverse"
forecasting relationship when they regress the excess monthly return on
a twenty—year bond relative to a one—month bill on the long—short spread
for the period 1955:1 to 1979:3. Shiller, Campbell and Schoenholtz
(1983) find this "perverse" relationship continues to hold when the U.S.
data are updated through mid—1982.
17.For a review of recent evidence regarding the existence of time—varying
term premiums, see Melino (1986).
18.This is the relevant benchmark, given our interest in looking for stable
relationships which might prove useful in a forecasting context. One
might also be interested, for example, in the size (and significance) of
the slope coefficient relative to the value predicted by the rational
expectations model. See, for example, Shiller, Campbell and Schoenholtz
(1983) and Pesando (1981, footnote 7).
19.As shown in Schmidt and Sickles (1977), the Chow test for structural
breaks can be unreliable when, as in the cases arising here, variances28
and sample sizes differ in the two subperiods. We thus performed an
asymptotic F—test (Amemiya 1985, pp. 31—38). For corporate bonds, the
relevant test statistic, which is distributed F(2, 110)), equalled
0.409. One cannot reject the null hypothesis of an unchanged
relationship for Canada bonds as well (F(2, 110) =0.392).This
latter result is less interesting in view of the lack of statistical
significance of the slope coefficients.
20. Because DRI and the Conference Board forecast the average value of the
interest rate during the quarter, the regressions were rerun with
quarterly averaged data and then used to generate the corresponding out—
of—sample forecasts.
21. It is useful to compare these results with those of Kane (1983), who
also examines survey data on interest rate forecasts. Kane concludes
that time—varying term premiums do exist and vary positively with the
level of interest rates. However, Kane further observes that such
variation is small relative to observed quarter—to—quarter changes in
long—term rates. He thus concludes that his results provide only
qualified support for the proposition that interest rate movements are
forecastable. The forecasts examined in this study indicate, under the
null hypothesis of market efficiency, a relatively more important role
for time—varying term premiums.
22.There is one anomaly in the behaviour of long—term rates in Canada
during the post—shift period that merits note. During this period,
there is a significant correlation between the current change in the
long—term Canada rate and the lagged long—term U.S. Government rate.
Indeed, the lagged U.S. rate explains a full 22 per cent of the variance
of the change in the long—term Canada rate during this period of29
volatile rates. This relationship does not, however, exist in the pre—
shift period. A regression of the excess return on long—term Canada
bonds on the lagged U.S. rate indicates that a one basis point rise in
the latter is associated with a 13.9 basis points rise in the excess
return during the post—shift period. We suspect that this relationship
is likely to prove to have been unique to this period, and thus not to
be useful in a forecasting context. Interestingly, the DRI forecasts of
changes in the long—term Canada rate are not influenced significantly by
the lagged U.S. rate. To the extent that the DRI forecasts are so
influenced, the relationship is in fact stronger in the pre—shift
period.30
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